Political and strategic analysts provided an in-depth reading of the transformations in Iran, their impact on regional security, and their repercussions on international alliances. The discussion centered on whether a tactical retreat serves as an entry point for an end to the war with Iran, and the philosophy behind such maneuvers.
Political analyst Amjad Taher argues that understanding Iranian behavior requires grasping the “philosophy of resilient flexibility,” a concept clearly articulated by the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in 2011 to explain the events of 2009 during the US-Iran negotiations. Taher explains that this philosophy is based on the principle of temporary tactical retreat to achieve a larger strategic goal. He cites Khamenei’s analogy where an enemy might seize a hand in battle; if the opponent resists, the hand breaks, so the better option is to walk with the enemy temporarily until an attack opportunity arises. Taher notes this concept is part of the Iranian regime’s crisis management mechanism, allowing for temporary flexibility without abandoning major goals.
Taher emphasizes that this logic also explains Iran’s stance on negotiations with the United States. Reports indicate Iran sees no issue with talks, but views them as a tool for regime survival rather than a principled stance. He links this to the battlefield: the side with military superiority dictates the terms of negotiation.
Regarding potential Iranian counter-moves, Taher warns that using the economic card could have reverse effects, potentially driving the world to form a broad international coalition against Iran. He notes the ripple effects would reach Europe and Asia, including Germany, France, South Korea, and even China. He cites attacks on Iranian oil depots in Tehran and Kish as limiting export capabilities. These factors, he suggests, may bolster US efforts to build an international alliance viewing Iran as a threat to global security, particularly concerning Red Sea shipping.
In terms of Gulf relations, Taher notes a discrepancy: Gulf states view Iran as a neighbor, while Tehran views them through a lens of rivalry. He suggests this dynamic could shift rapidly if circumstances change. While Gulf states possess economic power and alliance-building capabilities, they exercise this wisdom carefully. The region generally avoided war, preferring pressure to force US negotiations. However, the experience of the 2015 nuclear deal, where Gulf states were excluded despite Iran receiving billions, highlighted their exclusion from the benefits, prompting them to demand a role in future talks due to their economic and trade importance.
Strategic researcher Abdullah Al-Sawalha believes that while ending the war is a desired diplomatic goal, current conditions make negotiations unlikely. He attributes this to two main factors: the “absence of the state” concept in Iran, which he describes as having transitioned to a “post-state” phase characterized by the fragmentation of political and administrative organs and a lack of unified decision-making. The second factor is the incomplete nature of US and Israeli military objectives, which delays the negotiation phase until battlefield conditions change.
Al-Sawalha asserts that military reality is the decisive factor in determining political and media paths. He cites statements from US Central Command regarding the targeting of over 5,500 sites, suggesting that political discrepancies are part of a calculated strategy to create multiple scenarios to confuse Iranian decision-makers. These scenarios range from sending ground forces or commando operations to seizing Kish Island or supporting internal minorities, all aimed at dispersing Iranian resources.
He notes that the conflict involves two currents within the US: one focused on economic repercussions for elections and energy security, and the other on affirming US power projection. The war is not just US vs. Iran but intersects with the rivalry with China over technology, resources, ports, and logistics. Regarding Iran’s internal state, Al-Sawalha concludes that the traditional state structure has effectively ended, transforming into a militia-like entity. He cites US warnings about Iran using civilian infrastructure like schools and hospitals for missile and drone launches, a behavior similar to the Houthis in the Red Sea. This shift means the state no longer protects citizens but uses them as strategic assets. He hints at potential future Arab movements, noting Gulf states have red lines, though details remain classified.
